o te la fan?
Asia Report N°241 11 Dec 2012
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
After a decade of separatist violence in Thailand’s Malay/Muslim-majority southern provinces, insurgent capabilities are outpacing state counter-measures that are mired in complacency and political conflict. While Bangkok claims to make a virtue of patience, more sophisticated and brutal insurgent attacks increase the death toll. Successive governments have opted to muddle through South East Asia’s most violent internal conflict, their responses hostage to outmoded conceptions of the state, bureaucratic turf battles and a bitter national-level political struggle. In 2012, a new security policy for the region acknowledged for the first time the conflict’s political nature and identified decentralisation and dialogue with militants as components of a resolution. But fulfilling this policy demands that Thai leaders depoliticise the South issue, engage with civil society, build a consensus on devolving political power and accelerate efforts toward dialogue. Dialogue and decentralisation may be difficult for Bangkok to implement, but the necessary changes could become even more challenging over time.
The intractable power struggle between supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, deposed in a 2006 coup d’état, and his opponents in the army, bureaucracy and palace has overshadowed the conflict in the South. Yet, the region remains another arena for political gamesmanship. Civilian officials there and in Bangkok have been hamstrung by the need to respect military prerogatives and have searched in vain for a formula that can tamp down the violence without committing to political reforms. Deployment of some 60,000 security forces, special security laws and billions of dollars have not achieved any appreciable decline in casualties or curbed the movement.
For the past two years, violence has largely persisted below a threshold that might have generated public pressure for new approaches. Periodically, though, spectacular attacks thrust the conflict into national consciousness. A number of these have taken place in 2012, including the 31 March coordinated car-bombs in Yala and Hat Yai. Media broadcast of closed-circuit television (CCTV) video showing an audacious daylight strike that killed four soldiers in July in Mayo District, Pattani Province, confronted the public with brutal images that challenged official assurances that the government was on the right track. As overt political turmoil in Bangkok receded, the Deep South again became a hot topic for editors, bureaucrats and politicians, but this renewed attention has not yet prompted fresh thinking or new will to tackle the problem.
The Yingluck Shinawatra administration, which came to office in August 2011, placed its hopes for progress on Police Colonel Thawee Sodsong, a Thaksin loyalist chosen to lead the reinvigorated Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC). Through determination and unstinting cash hand-outs, Thawee won a degree of personal approval within in the region. But the 31 March bombings coincided with first reports of Thaksin’s fumbled attempt to start a peace process with exiled militant leaders and allegations that the two events were linked. With Thaksin denying he talked with rebel leaders and violence and recriminations mounting, the dialogue process appeared to be back at square one. Faced with continued insurgent violence, the cabinet approved a high-level “war room” to coordinate the work of seventeen ministries with responsibilities in the Deep South. This did not blunt the bureaucratic impulse to tinker with organisational charts, however, as security officials called for re-subordination of the civilian SBPAC to the military-dominated Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC).
The contours of a political resolution to the conflict in southern Thailand have long been in the public domain, but Bangkok has been unable to commit to a comprehensive and decisive approach. A promising three-year policy issued by the National Security Council in early 2012 recognises a political dimension of the violence and codifies decentralisation and dialogue as official strategy, but its implementation is likely to be impeded by political and bureaucratic infighting. The government should reverse the militarisation of the Deep South, lift the draconian security laws and end the security forces’ impunity, all of which help stimulate the insurgency. Thai leaders should also forge a broad national consensus for bold action to resolve the conflict, including decentralisation of political power, earnest engagement with civil society and sustained efforts to cultivate a peace dialogue with the insurgency. Talking to its representatives, changing the way the Deep South is governed, delivering justice, and recognising the region’s unique culture are all elements of a comprehensive approach to reducing the violence.
As Bangkok dithers, the insurgents are growing bolder and more capable. They are conducting attacks that are attracting, if not deliberately seeking, more attention. Thailand has been fortunate that the military have considered it in their strategic interest to contain the fight within their proclaimed territory, but the violence has evolved at a pace that is starting to challenge the ability of the government to respond on its own terms. Without more creative thinking and deft action, Bangkok risks losing the initiative.
To the Government of Thailand:
1. Develop a unified approach to transforming the conflict based on full implementation of the National Security Council (NSC) Administration and Development Policy for Southern Border Provinces, 2012-2014, by undertaking to:
a) create a cross-party consensus, possibly embodied in a national accord, that resolution of the conflict is a national priority;
b) establish a durable non-partisan mechanism mandated by the prime minister’s office and including respected individuals, in and out of government, to pursue dialogue with insurgent representatives;
c) commit to serious consideration of political decentralisation, consistent with the principle of a unitary state as enshrined in the constitution, with the aim of drafting legislation; and
d) engage with civil society initiatives that seek to foster more representative government and peaceful conflict resolution.
2. Lift the emergency decree and martial law in those districts where they remain in effect and, until further reforms are feasible, rely on the Internal Security Act (ISA) instead, ensuring that all regulations invoked are consistent with the preservation of human rights.
3. Ensure accountability for human rights abuses committed by security forces, including past incidents.
To the Separatist Movement:
4. Acknowledge that the protracted violence is detrimental to the well-being and development of the population in the southernmost provinces.
5. Observe obligations of non-state armed actors under international humanitarian law and abide by the rules of engagement issued by the Patani United Liberation Organisation, which prohibit attacks on civilians, displacement of the civilian population and acts of retribution.
6. Recognise that self-determination and maintenance of Thailand’s territorial integrity and sovereignty are compatible and prepare to respond to initiatives by state representatives and civil society to pursue dialogue on peaceful conflict resolution.
7. Expand bases of popular support through continued community outreach, while maintaining channels of communication with officials and militants.
8. Avoid advocating preconceived political agendas and instead inform debate on political reform and conflict resolution by identifying and expressing popular concerns and preferences.
Bangkok/Brussels, 11 December 2012